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A version of the opening essay of Judith Butler’s book Precarious Life (2004), 
“Explanation and Exoneration, or What We Can Hear,” was first published in Theory & 
Event in late 2001.1 It was part of a special issue edited by members of the journal’s 
editorial board in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. In their introductory note to 
the special issue, the four editors, Wendy Brown, Bill Chaloupka, Tom Dumm and Paul 
Patton, reveal a number of the hesitations and concerns that they had to work through in 
curating a volume that would speak to the event. Was it too soon to speak, amidst cries of 
war and grief? Was it their turn to speak, rather than, say, Middle Eastern colleagues 
whose voices were much needed at this juncture? Was it possible to speak, as politically 
invested theorists, without instrumentalizing the violence in the service of their own 
investments, even if inadvertently? The airing of these hesitations do not exactly serve, in 
this instance, as self-shielding disclaimers. There is instead a sense of exposure – we 
cannot afford not to speak, and so we cannot but risk error and misfire. Given the overall 
quality of the contributions to the special issue, the worry may not have been entirely 
necessary, if nevertheless understandable: Having to grapple with an unexpectedly sudden 
escalation of violence, in this case, the event of 9/11 and its immediately bloodthirsty 
aftermath, endangers thought in particularly insidious ways. How to make sense of the 
events without being benumbed to the senselessness of the suffering endured and the 
suffering to come? How to conceive of what is likely to follow, without at the same time 
lending one’s thought to a form of inadvertent complicity with it? How to formulate 
critique in a modality of non-violence, when thought finds itself triggered by and steeped 
in so much violence?  
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One can read Judith Butler’s contribution to the special issue in part as a response 
to these questions, even if it doesn’t directly engage them. Her inquiry begins from the 
conditions of public discourse in the United States in the wake of 9/11. She addresses 
forms of censorship and anti-intellectualism that were operating at the time, such as the 
dismissal of any attempt to understand the grounds and causes of the conflict as providing 
excuses for the attackers and thus exonerating them; the exclusion of critical and historical 
perspectives, inquiries and debates from the realm of the audible; the stricture on 
questioning the U.S. foreign policy’s contribution to creating a world where such acts of 
violence are possible; and the attendant marginalization and mockery of anti-war 
positions. Butler notes that this exclusion of critical and anti-war perspectives creates an 
impoverished public discourse that sustains itself on a hegemonic grammar of the sayable, 
on narrative devices that prioritize the first person register while pathologizing the 
nation’s “enemies,” and on a customized vocabulary that differentially allocates moral 
blame and justification for acts of violence, often solely depending on whether the 
perpetrators are “us” or “them”. So the limits imposed on public discourse serve as a 
frame that not only leaves out certain types of analyses but also legitimizes retaliatory 
violence. 
Thus far we are on familiar territory. The problem that Butler identifies here was 
in part an intensification of an already existing trend in U.S. mainstream public discourse 
on terrorism. In a section entitled “The Semantic of Terror and Violence” in their 1979 
book,2 Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman suggest that the differential allocation of the 
epithet “terror” to acts of violence on the basis of “reasons of state” was already in 
operation during the U.S. imperialist adventures in Southeast Asia in the late 1950s. In 
their account, this nomenclature became institutionalized in the 1970s. They demonstrate 
this partially through a critique of Terrorism, a 1977 book by Walter Laqueur,3 now 
 3 
considered a founding text of “terrorism studies” – an interesting clue that terrorism 
expertise may have always produced “terrorology” within ideological bounds. As 
Chomsky notes elsewhere, during Ronald Reagan’s presidency in the 1980s, a first 
episode of the “war on terror” was launched, two decades before the attacks of 9/11, “with 
much the same rhetoric and many of the same people in high level positions.”4 Coinciding 
with Benjamin Netanyahu’s term as the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations (1984-
88), this period further entrenched historically and critically impoverished ways of talking 
and thinking about political violence in the U.S. An incensed 1986 book review by 
Edward Said, of Benjamin Netanyahu’s edited volume Terrorism: How the West Can Win 
(“Win what?” Said rightly questions) captures well this earlier episode of, 
a full-scale ideological and cultural battle against terrorism–a battle whose main 
thrust has been, first, its selectivity (“we” are never terrorists no matter what we 
may have done; “they” always are and always will be), and, second, its wholesale 
attempt to obliterate history, and indeed temporality itself. For the main thing is to 
isolate your enemy from time, from causality, from prior action, and thereby to 
portray him or her as ontologically and gratuitously interested in wreaking havoc 
for its own sake. Thus if you can show that Libyans, Moslems, Palestinians and 
Arabs, generally speaking, have no reality except that which tautologically 
confirms their terrorist essence as Libyans, Moslems, Palestinians and Arabs, you 
can go on to attack them and their “terrorist” states generally, and avoid all 
questions about your own behavior or about your share in their present fate.5 
Said believed that this “machinery for pushing the terrorist scare” would 
eventually “stand exposed for the political and intellectual scandal that it is.”6 One of the 
effects of reading Butler’s text alongside Said’s is, therefore, having to lament recent 
history’s betrayal of Said’s belief in public wisdom. But there is another way in which the 
two texts sit together. Toward the end of his piece, Said warns that “Past and future 
bombing raids aside, the terrorism craze is dangerous because it consolidates the immense, 
 4 
unrestrained pseudopatriotic narcissism we are nourishing.”7 He does not say more about 
the workings and manifestations of this narcissism. And as if taking over from where Said 
had left off fifteen years earlier, Butler writes about the attacks of 9/11 in terms of “the 
enormous narcissistic wound opened up by the public display of our physical 
vulnerability.” This psychosocial perspective becomes an important component of her 
analysis of the frame of censorship and war that operates to both exclude critique and 
legitimize retaliatory violence: The exclusion of critical and historical perspectives 
sustains the disavowal of any responsibility on the part of the U.S. itself, and thus prevents 
complicating the question of agency and victimhood. The framing out of these more 
difficult questions of responsibility thus serves to legitimize and render righteous 
retaliatory violence. In turn, retaliatory violence is meant to compensate for the 
narcissistic wound, and to magically reinstitute the U.S.’s fantasized invincibility and 
invulnerability, when these have been so suddenly and spectacularly compromised by the 
attacks. The first person, first-worldist, unilateralist register of the hegemonic grammar 
that Butler identifies undergirds every stage of this operation.  
 Butler’s main contribution in her article is to intervene, on the basis of this 
analysis, to carve out another frame, one that can allow the thinking of the grounds and 
horizons of non-violence. Effectively inverting the operative frame of war that she has 
unpacked for her reader, Butler’s proposal is that allowing critical and historical 
perspectives into public discourse will assist in sharing the onus of collective 
responsibility in contemporary structures of violence. Such an avowal of responsibility 
can in turn serve as a resource not for more war but for the recognition of global 
interdependency and a shared condition of vulnerability. In other words, the de-centering 
effected and the vulnerability exposed by the attacks can be seized as an opportunity for 
re-imagining U.S. foreign policy and the nation’s place within an international 
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community, with a consideration for “the ways in which our lives are profoundly 
implicated in the lives of others,” and an ear for being addressed in the second or third 
person.  
“Perhaps the question cannot be heard at all, but I would still like to ask” was 
Butler’s preface to inquiring in this piece about “another meaning, and another possibility, 
for the decentering of the first person narrative within the global framework”, and as she 
suspected, her proposal was indeed inaudible on the level of mainstream politics. Her 
prompt response to 9/11 is nonetheless striking in its immediate political astuteness, as it 
combines clarity of analysis with an ability to imagine otherwise amidst the ruckus and the 
ruin. Striking, too, in its eventual intellectual fecundity: It is here that we find early 
formulations of her thought on frames of war and violence, on vulnerability as a resource 
for politics and ethics, on the bases of global cohabitation, and on the question of 
grievability and its differential distribution – influential thinking that she has further 
developed in subsequent publications.  
Thinking alongside this essay today, three general observations can be made. First, 
it may be necessary to begin from the recognition that the task of “explanation” itself, in 
the word’s root sense “of making plain” and “flattening,” has become more difficult. 
When Said was writing in 1986, he did not need to take recourse to figurative language to 
explain the historicity of, for example, Palestinian “terrorism.” When Butler was writing 
in 2001, she cited Arundhati Roy’s suggestion that Osama bin Laden had been “sculpted 
from the spare rib of a world laid waste by America’s foreign policy,” as a figurative 
explanation that needed to be heard at the time. Now, another fifteen war-filled years on, 
what language can efficiently “make plain” without explaining away the historicity of, for 
example, Daesh? Embodied in this strange creature of sustained war and violence, 
terrorism discourse comes closest to its ideal enemy, a seemingly anachronistic 
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monstrosity that makes it that much easier “to isolate [the] enemy from time, from 
causality, from prior action, and thereby to portray him or her as ontologically and 
gratuitously interested in wreaking havoc for its own sake,” as Said had written. It may be 
helpful here to remember Allen Feldman’s suggestion that in contexts of prolonged 
conflict, it will no longer suffice to read violence as the surface expression of “deeper” 
issues, such as socioeconomic conditions or political grievances.8 Violence comes to 
acquire its own performative and symbolic autonomy “as a self-legitimating sphere of 
social discourse and transaction.”9 It has its own internal semantics, forces of causation 
and economy of exchange. It is in this sense (and not in the racist sense of culturalist 
explanations such as “Islam is a culture of death”) that Feldman writes of violence as a 
“culture” and an “institution” unto itself. Perhaps it is not entirely coincidental, then, that 
Daesh, this perfectly distorted spawn of imperialist wars, calls itself a “state” and engages 
in the most banal tedium of statehood and bureaucracy at the first opportunity,10 indicating 
something of the ways in which state violence recycles and reinstitutes itself in 
contemporary formations of war.  
Secondly, the mainstream institutional approach to “explaining” terrorism has also 
shifted in the fifteen years since the publication of Butler’s essay. As Arun Kundnani 
suggests, by 2004, the taboo on discussing the causes of terrorism was no longer 
sustainable for the purposes of the war on terror itself.11 This is when the concept of 
“radicalization” began to have currency in policy-making and policing, first in the U.K., 
and soon after in the U.S., as an explanation of sorts. Refining the earlier crude culturalist 
and psychological approaches, the notion of radicalization is based on the assumption that 
terrorists come from a wider milieu of non-violent extremism, and that a combination of 
individual psychological circumstances, and theological and ideological indoctrination 
turns some extremists into terrorists. Thus the idea for policy makers is to target non-
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violent extremism as a breeding ground. Importantly, identity and community are seen as 
essential factors in radicalization, and there are assumed to be perceivable indicators of 
this process, so that the risk is imagined as manageable through surveillance, intelligence 
and policing of certain populations. Radicalization discourse thus contributes to the 
legitimation of the intensive surveillance of Muslim minorities as a new suspect 
community.12 As with other governmental strategies based on risk-management, a concept 
of “vulnerability” finds its place in this discourse, in the form of “vulnerability to 
radicalization,” so that those who are suspected of such vulnerability (i.e. deemed 
potential terrorists in the making) must be “safeguarded,” and are treated both as “at risk” 
and “as risk.”13 Notably, this language of vulnerability operates on an entirely different 
register than Butler’s proposal to conceive of vulnerability as a resource for feminist 
politics and resistance.14 The latter requires understanding vulnerability as both an 
ineliminable and a differentially distributed product of social relations, and the concept’s 
radical political potential stems from this double movement of struggling against the 
conditions of its differential distribution, while striving to accommodate its ineliminability 
in our critical imaginaries of co-habitation. On the other hand, in its increasingly 
institutionalized versions, such as the “vulnerability to radicalization” formulation found 
in the war on terror, vulnerability is treated as a problem to be addressed through risk 
management and “resilience-building”, thus serving to shore up the paternalistic and 
interventionist power of the state.  
Radicalization accounts and theories have become extremely widespread and 
popular in the endlessly burgeoning field of terrorism studies and in counter-terrorism 
policies, but as Kundnani points out in his study of this literature: 
Answers to the question of what drives this process [of radicalization] are to 
exclude ascribing any causative role to the actions of Western governments or their 
allies in other parts of the world; instead, individual psychological or theological 
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journeys, largely removed from social and political circumstances, are claimed to 
be the root cause of the radicalization process. While some accounts acknowledge 
politics as a component –using euphemistic phrases such as “grievances against 
real or perceived injustices”– this is only done in the face of overwhelming 
empirical evidence, before they quickly move on to the more comfortable ground 
of psychology or theology.15  
Thus the explanations that are currently in vogue and around which much scholarly 
gesturing and policy revolves, in fact further entrench the “institutionalization of the 
denial and avoidance of history.”16 The kettle logic of such denial can be traced, for 
example, in the U.K.’s “Prevent” strategy, a key component of the government’s counter-
terrorism policy entirely underpinned by theories of radicalization.17 In the official Prevent 
strategy document, the government cites qualitative research concerning the factors that 
contribute to radicalization and support for terrorism in the following words:  
Support for violence is associated with a lack of trust in democratic government 
and with an aspiration to defend Muslims when they appear to be under attack or 
unjustly treated. Issues which can contribute to a sense that Muslim communities 
are being unfairly treated include so-called “stop and search” powers used by the 
police under counter-terrorism legislation; the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy; a 
perception of biased and Islamophobic media coverage; and UK foreign policy, 
notably with regard to Muslim countries, the Israel-Palestine conflict and the war 
in Iraq.18 
The strategy document does not then go on to dispute these findings, in fact, they are 
admitted to be “important” and “largely supported by other classified work.”19 In other 
words, the official government strategy avows that discriminatory counter-terrorism 
policing practices, the U.K.’s official counter-terrorism strategy and foreign policies 
(including the Iraq War, the U.K.’s role in which was a significant milestone for a 
generation’s “lack of trust in democratic government”) have contributed to increasing 
support for terrorism among British Muslims. Yet this momentary avowal does not 
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translate into policy proposals that may mitigate this effect. It does not yield attempts to 
address the crisis of parliamentary democracy, a decision to desist from the counter-
productive counter-terrorism strategy, or the pursuance of an official anti-war position in 
foreign policy. To the contrary, the rest of the document goes on to discuss how the 
government will expand and intensify its existing counter-terrorism strategy, including 
extending surveillance duties to schools, universities and colleges, faith institutions and 
healthcare providers so that there may be “no ‘ungoverned spaces’ in which extremism is 
allowed to flourish.”20 
 Thirdly, and relatedly, the limits imposed on public discourse in the war on terror 
have become not only further institutionalized through the criminal law, but also 
governmentalized through radicalization discourse. As an example of the former, the 
ongoing case of the Academics for Peace in Turkey is at first glance an anomaly for a 
“democracy”: more than one thousand academics are currently under criminal 
investigation on charges of “propagandizing for a terrorist organization,” with another 
thousand expecting their turn, all for having signed a peace petition.21 And yet, when we 
consider the wording of the relevant legislation, as well as the line of interrogation that the 
academics are subjected to, the case actually sits comfortably within the current global 
legal regime of the war on terror. For example, a similar formulation criminalizing the 
“encouragement of terrorism,” can be found in the U.K.’s Terrorism Act of 2006, defined 
as any “statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the 
public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement 
to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism,” regardless of 
“whether any person is in fact encouraged or induced by the statement to commit, prepare 
or instigate any such act or offence”. One of the questions that Turkey’s academics face in 
the police interrogation implies that the peace petition was “coordinated” with or by the 
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Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), the organization the academics are accused of 
propagandizing for. Note that in the U.S., the Patriot Act’s prohibition against “material 
support for terrorism” has been interpreted in the 2010 Supreme Court judgment of 
Holder v Humanitarian Law Project22 to include engaging in “coordinated” forms of 
public speech such as teaching and advocacy, that is understood to further a terrorist 
organization’s political objectives, even when these are lawful objectives. Thus the 
existence of such legal provisions in jurisdictions where the rule of law appears less 
compromised because the provisions are more selectively (read: discriminatorily)23 
utilized, directly legitimate these legal practices around counter-terrorism elsewhere, even 
when these are so indiscriminate as to draw people with cultural and intellectual capital 
into their wide net. Thus calling on a government to bring its legal practices into line with 
democratic standards often involves the failure to recognize how far this line has shifted in 
the war on terror globally. This may be something to bear in mind for thinking about “the 
ways in which our lives are profoundly implicated in the lives of others,” and what forms 
solidarity may need to take today.   
 But if the developments in the U.K. can be deemed indicative of future global 
trends in the war on terror, something other than outright criminalization of speech seems 
to be underway, and this may effect a different kind of shift in the status of and the space 
for critical thought. Let’s call this, if rather inelegantly, the governmentalization of the 
limits on public discourse: The latest piece of anti-terror legislation in the U.K., the 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015, has taken a sure step towards leaving “no 
ungoverned spaces,” by imposing a “Prevent duty” on numerous authorities, including 
local governments, criminal justice institutions, schools, childcare providers, higher and 
further education bodies, and healthcare services. Formulated as a duty to “have due 
regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism,” the primary effect 
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of this is the compulsory recruitment of local council workers, probation officers, 
teachers, healthcare providers, university lecturers and other professionals as informants 
who must monitor the potential radicalization of the members of the public they come into 
contact with as part of their day-to-day work. Thus the most alarming problem with the 
duty is its capacity to institutionalize Islamophobia on a massive scale. But it poses an 
additional and subtler problem within the educational context, as it directly targets both 
the limits of acceptable speech, and the very conditions of critique. The former is a matter 
of definitions, since the duty to prevent radicalization comes with an implied obligation 
not to radicalize students or to expose them to extremism, including “non-violent 
extremism,” when extremism is officially defined in rather ambiguous terms as “vocal or 
active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.”24 The 
latter, the targeting of the conditions of critique, has to do not with the limits imposed on 
what can be up for debate, but with the Prevent duty’s very mode of implementation, 
which is one of extending risk assessment into every corner of educational settings.25 The 
chains of speculative reasoning inherent to risk thinking combined with the will to leave 
no space ungoverned pose a direct threat to the conditions of possibility of critique in 
spaces of learning, especially if we understand critique as “the art of not being governed 
‘quite so much’.”26 
 Fifteen years on, the hegemonic grammar of terrorism discourse has tightened its 
grip on the spaces and conditions of thought – partially because it thrives in war: the more 
prolonged the military war, the more its autonomously generative formations play havoc 
with the viability and audibility of critical registers in which historicities and temporalities 
of violence may be understood. Meanwhile officially sanctioned doctrines of 
radicalization proliferate as high-yielding pseudo-explanations that mass-produce laws, 
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procedures and magical policies that do not necessitate desisting from war. In turn, 
radicalization discourse colonizes spaces of thinking in ever more intrusive ways, so much 
so that critique in the war on terror may no longer be solely dismissed as exonerating 
terrorism, but also potentially be burdened with the charge of contributing to it. The onus 
is shifting. All the more reason to insisting on the ungovernability of the risk of critique, 
so that we can continue imagining otherwise.  
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